

Entergy Operations, Inc. 1448 S.R. 333 Russellville, AR 72802 Tel 479-858-4710

David B. BiceActing Manager, Licensing
Arkansas Nuclear One

2CAN021001

February 02, 2010

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: Licensee Event Report 50-368/2009-005-00

Manual Reactor Trip and Emergency Feedwater Actuation

Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2

Docket No. 50-368 License No. NPF-6

Dear Sir or Madam:

Pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), enclosed is the subject Licensee Event Report concerning a manual Reactor trip and Emergency Feedwater actuation on December 8, 2009.

There are no new commitments contained in this submittal.

Sincerely,

DBB/slc

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Elmo Collins

Regional Administrator

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Region IV

612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-4125

NRC Senior Resident Inspector Arkansas Nuclear One P.O. Box 310 London, AR 72847

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 LEREvents@inpo.org

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-2007)						ON A	APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/2010								
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)) in E to 10 us th	Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.								
1. FACILITY NAME Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2							2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000368				3. PAGE 1 OF 4				
4. TITLE	тить Manual Reactor Scram and Emergency Feedwater Automatic Actuation due to an Unexpected Plant Response Following the Loss of a Main Feedwater Pump at Full Power.														
5.	EVENT DAT	ſE.	6.	LER NUMBER	t ·	7. RE	REPORT DATE 8: OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED								
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV NO		MONTH	TH DAY YEAR		FACILITY NAME		DOCKET NUMBER					
12	08	2009	2009	005	00	02	02	2010	FACILITY N/	TY NAME DOCKET		KET NUMBER			
9. OPERA	TING MODI	E		11. THIS REP	ORT IS	SUBMITTE	D PUR	SUANT T	O THE REQUIREM	ENTS OF 1	O CFR §:	(Check all tha	it apply)		
1			20.2201(d) 20.220 20.2203(a)(1) 20.220 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(20.2203(i 50.36(c)(3(a)(3)(ii)		ii)(A) ii)(B) iii)						
10. POWER LEVEL			20.2 20.2 20.2	2203(a)(2)(ii) 2203(a)(2)(iii) 2203(a)(2)(iv) 2203(a)(2)(v) 2203(a)(2)(vi))] 50.36(c)(] 50.36(c)(] 50.46(a)(] 50.73(a)(] 50.73(a)((2) (3)(ii) (2)(i)(A	()	 ∑ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 		 □ 50.73(a)(2)(x) □ 73.71(a)(4) □ 73.71(a)(5) □ OTHER- Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A □ Specify in Abstract below 0 Specify in NRC Form 366A □ Specify in NRC Form 366A □ Specify in NRC Form 366A □ Specify in NRC Form				
0				12	2. LICI	ENSEE CO	ONTAC	T FOR T	HIS LER						
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)															
David B	. Bice, A			, Licensin	_						-858-4				
-1-6				ONE LINE P	_	PORTABLE	PONE	100	URE DESCRIBED			RT MANU-	REPORTABLE		
CAUSE	SYSTE		PONENT	FACTURER		TO EPIX		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPON	HENT	FACTURER	TO EPIX		
Х	SJ		Р	D055		Y			· ·						
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED					_		5.		15. EXPECTED UBMISSION DATE		TH DAY	YEAR			
			-	D SUBMISSIO			⊠ NC				, U				
On (AN ma Ope Ge (EF The (plate that Readon))	December 100-2) was inually triple erating Funerator (FW) system 100-100 to 1	ber 08, 2 as opera ripped in Procedur (SG) war tem auto of MFWP er reduct matic act rels could p. Follov plant data	2009, a ating ne responder (AOI of the level	ear 100 per nse to hig P) was exel decrease ally actuate contained te) that was setpoint. ecovered for e subject	entra ercen ph thro xecut sed to ted at instras ne The follow even MFW	I Standant power tust bear the des ructions ecessary ANO-2 wing the property AOP	ard T ir whe iring t manu exima signe s whice y to re plan e loss olant s was	Time (Continue) and the 'temper and Real setpech limit recover at simulating the continue of a March simulating revised	es) CST), Arkansa 'A' Main Feed rature. The Lactor trip was ' percent. The point of 22.2 peed the Main ' SG water le lator respons IFWP from futor software valued to provide a	dwater land to so of land to s	Pump MFWF d whe rgency to res e load or to re previous er with rised to tition st	o (MFWP) P Abnorm on the 'A' S y Feedwar store SG le reduction reaching the usly indication to incorpor trategy ba	was al Steam ter evels. rate he ated ring a rate used on		

replacement of the 'A' MFWP thrust bearing, ANO-2 returned to near full power on December 13,

2009, at approximately 1813 CST.

NRC FORM 366A COMMISSION **U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY**

(9-2007)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE		
Arkansas Nuclear One – Unit 2	05000368	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2	OF	4
		2009	- 005 -	00			

NARRATIVE

A. Plant Status

At the time of the event, Arkansas Nuclear One – Unit 2 (ANO-2) was operating near 100 percent power. All structures, systems, and components that were used, or could have been used to mitigate, reduce the consequences of, or limit the safety implications of the event were available.

B. Event Description

On December 08, 2009, at approximately 0837 Central Standard Time, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 (ANO-2) was operating near 100 percent power when the 'A' Main Feedwater Pump (MFWP) [SJ] [P] was manually tripped due to high thrust bearing temperature. The subject MFWP is one of two installed MFWPs manufactured by Delaval, and utilizes an outboard Kingsbury double thrust bearing. In response to the manual trip of the MFWP, ANO-2 Operators entered the Loss of MFWP Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) and commenced Reactor Coolant System (RCS) [AB] boration while decreasing Main Turbine [TA] load. The Loss of MFWP AOP contained instructions that limited the Main Turbine load reduction rate (plant power reduction rate) that was necessary to recover Steam Generator (SG) [JB] water levels using the operating MFWP prior to reaching the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) [BA] automatic actuation setpoint of 22.2 percent. When water level in the 'A' SG decreased to approximately 27 percent, a manual Reactor trip was initiated. The EFW system automatically actuated as designed to restore SG levels. Operator response was consistent with recent simulator training using the Loss of MFWP AOP; however, the ANO-2 plant simulator response had indicated that SG levels could be successfully recovered following the loss of a MFWP from full power without requiring a Reactor trip and without EFW automatic actuation.

The feedwater flow characteristics programmed into the ANO-2 simulator were based on engineering analysis following the ANO-2 power uprate in 2002. Subsequent to the power uprate, feedwater modifications were implemented and mitigation strategies were changed which included the use of a fourth (standby) Condensate Pump [SD] in a loss of MFWP event to maximize available main feedwater flow. Analysis concluded that a slight increase in total feedwater flow would be achieved by starting the standby condensate pump with only one MFWP operating. Given the absence of actual plant data for a post-uprate MFWP trip, the ANO-2 simulator was validated against the predicted engineering data and vendor supplied pump curves. The post-uprate modifications and estimated main feedwater flows were programmed into the ANO-2 simulator, which indicated that a MFWP trip at full power could be mitigated using the revised strategy. The Loss of MFWP AOP was revised to incorporate the post-uprate mitigation strategy.

(9-2007)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6	3. PAGE				
Arkansas Nuclear One – Unit 2	05000368	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3	OF	4
Andriodo Nacional Chio Chin 2		2009	- 005 -	00			•

C. Apparent Causes

The thrust bearing failure was caused by excessive thrust loading. The equipment degradation causing the excessive thrust loading could not be definitively determined without an internal inspection of the pump; however, changes in hydraulic performance, combined with the thrust bearing inspection, indicate a potential defect or degradation associated with the pump internals.

Analysis of the December 08, 2009 plant transient data revealed differences between the actual plant response and the ANO-2 simulator program. SG levels decreased much faster during the plant transient than previously indicated by the simulator. Actual plant feedwater flows after a loss of MFWP were less than the original engineering estimates programmed into the simulator, with no discernable increase in actual plant feedwater flows when the fourth condensate pump was started. ANO-2 had not experienced a MFWP trip from full power since power uprate; therefore, actual plant data for maximum achievable feedwater flows at full power with a single MFWP in service were not available until the subject event occurred. Additionally, the Loss of MFWP AOP mitigation strategies based on the main feedwater power uprate analysis and simulator performance contained instructions that limited the Main Turbine load reduction rate (plant power reduction rate) required to recover SG water levels for the subject event using the remaining operating MFWP prior to reaching the EFW automatic actuation setpoint.

D. Corrective Actions

The ANO-2 plant simulator software was revised to incorporate actual plant data observed from the loss of MFWP at full power event. The Loss of MFWP AOP was revised to provide a mitigation strategy based on data from the actual plant response, and was validated using the revised ANO-2 plant simulator model. The 'A' MFWP thrust bearing was replaced, with plans to disassemble the subject MFWP to determine the cause of pump hydraulic degradation and excessive thrust loads when spare parts become available. An enhanced monitoring program has been established to ensure early detection of thrust bearing degradation until MFWP maintenance can be initiated.

E. Safety Significance

Systems and components required to shutdown the Reactor, maintain safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, and control the release of radioactive material were available and performed as required. Following the manual Reactor trip, the EFW system automatically actuated as designed to restore SG levels. No safety limits were exceeded. The safety significance of this event is considered to be minimal.

F. Basis for Reportability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B)."

NRC FORM 366A COMMISSION **U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY**

(9-2007)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	(6. LER NUMBER				3. PAGE			
Arkansas Nuclear One – Unit 2	05000368	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	4	OF	4			
, and reside. One one		2009	- 005 -	00		.	·			

G. Additional Information

A review of the last five years of reportable events reveals one event that could potentially be considered similar in that the event resulted in a manual Reactor trip and EFW automatic actuation due to equipment failure in the Main Feedwater system; however the initiating cause of the event was not similar.

Licensee Event Report 50-368/2009-001-00:

"On Friday, March 13, 2009, at approximately 21:51 CDT, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 was manually tripped from 84% power due to decreasing level in the "B" Steam Generator caused by the "B" Main Feedwater Regulating Valve moving in the closed direction without input demand to close. The trip was manually initiated at approximately the 25% Steam Generator water level. Due to the valve malfunction the system was unable to restore the Steam Generator water level before the 22.2% Emergency Feedwater System Control actuation set point was reached. The Emergency Feedwater System actuated, as designed, restoring Steam Generator water levels to normal. Post trip responses were normal with all plant safety systems functioning as expected. Investigation revealed that the most probable root cause of the event was a foreign substance in the clearance area of the armature, internal to a current-to-pressure (I/P) converter in the "B" Main Feedwater Regulating Valve positioner. The positioner was replaced and tested, and Unit 2 returned to 100% power operation, Mode 1, at 17:01 CDT on March 17, 2009."

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component codes are identified in the text as [XX].